Ambiguity in a dialectical perspective by van Laar, Jan Albert
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 4
May 17th, 9:00 AM - May 19th, 5:00 PM
Ambiguity in a dialectical perspective
Jan Albert van Laar
Groningen University
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been
accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please
contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
van Laar, Jan Albert, "Ambiguity in a dialectical perspective" (2001). OSSA Conference Archive. 73.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA4/papersandcommentaries/73
Title:        Ambiguity in a dialectical perspective 
Author:   Jan Albert van Laar 
Response to this paper by:  Larry Powers 
© 2001 Jan Albert van Laar 
1. Introduction 
When playing soccer I have to compensate for my lack of skill and technique by making 
body checks and nasty tackles, which are offences against the rules. Now and then I am punished 
by a warning, or the other party gets compensated by obtaining a free kick. Although I am 
violating important and indispensable rules, my offences and the ensuing punishments are still 
part of what is properly called soccer. I am playing it in an incorrect way. If, however, the rules 
are violated in a more drastic way, for instance by closing the goal with an extra net in front of it, 
or by putting a second ball into the game, these actions are no longer part of what is properly 
called soccer.  Then I am not playing soccer anymore. 
Having a discussion resembles playing soccer, in my view, in having these two kinds of 
rules. Consequently, in an adequate explication of the concept of having a discussion one should 
distinguish between on the one hand performing speech acts which are still discussion moves, 
but which are liable to some serious charge, and on the other hand performing speech acts by 
which one abandons what could really be called a discussion. 
Starting from this distinction, this paper examines the use of ambiguities in discussions. 
Which uses of ambiguity are still part of a critical discussion and can therefore be criticized 
within such a discussion, and which uses are not part of a critical discussion and can 
consequently not be criticized within a critical discussion? 
To answer these questions, I shall first underscore the view that raising fallacy criticisms is 
an integral part of dialectics. Then I shall indicate what is wrong with contextual ambiguities but 
at the same time emphasize that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for real and imperfect 
discussants to steer clear of using contextually ambiguous expressions.  This is a reason for 
considering a reasonable procedure that constitutes a model for discussion that accommodates 
ambiguity. In the main part of the paper, I shall sketch such a procedure in an informal way. 
Incorporating fallacy criticisms gives rise to a classification of different types of fallacies, which 
will be provided at the end. In an appendix a more formal description can be found of the type of 
dialogue presented in this paper. 
2. Capturing points of order: Ambiguous!, Equivocation! 
According to pragma-dialectics, discussions should ideally be regulated by a certain 
procedure for critical discussion. This procedure consists of rules which promote the making of 
discussion moves that contribute to the main goal of a critical discussion, resolving a conflict of 
opinions, and moreover prohibiting the making of moves that obstruct or hinder this goal. In case 
of a discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinions, rule violations can and should be 
criticized as obstructing the goal of the discussion, that is, they should be considered a fallacious 
(van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, 104).  
Suppose now that a proponent offers an argument that contains an expression that is 
ambiguous in the context of use, and that it is consequently not obvious what the intended 
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interpretation is. Then the opponent can analyze the ambiguity and criticize the proponent of 
violating a rule for critical discussion. Rule 10 for critical discussion, which is at stake here, runs 
as follows: ‘A party must not use formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly 
ambiguous and he must interpret the other party's formulations as carefully and accurately as 
possible’ (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, p. 196). The proponent's contribution to the 
dialogue is not in accordance with the procedure for critical discussion and should therefore be 
withdrawn from the dialogue and possibly replaced by a non-ambiguous one. With the procedure 
as a regulative ideal, one is able to criticize bad discussion moves as fallacious, but the pragma-
dialectical procedure does not regulate raising these fallacy criticisms. The reason probably is 
that the procedure describes ideal discussionbehavior, and does not deal with how the rules are to 
be applied to non-ideal behavior, to rule-violations.1 
Contrary to such an approach, Hamblin proposed to view the fallacy of equivocation from 
the perspective of making points of order2 within a discussion (1970). In interesting cases of 
ambiguity, theorists cannot determine whether in fact a fallacy has been committed or not. But 
they can view the situation from a dialectical perspective and investigate discussion moves in 
which one party accuses the other party of committing the fallacy of equivocation.  
Mackenzie elaborated on this idea of making points of order. He proposed a formal 
dialectical system in which the opponent has a device to criticize an equivocal argument (1988).3 
Moreover, he proposed a formal dialectical system that is made up of two parts. There is an inner 
system DC of rules that state which moves are DC-legal. If some party violates a DC-rule, there 
is a system of DC+ rules by which this violation can be criticized (1981, p. 172-176).4  
Krabbe took up the issue from the angle of dialogue profiles (1996). Given a certain history 
of a discussion up to a point, the discussant whose move it is can choose from a set of 
alternatives. Some of these options concern topic points, other concern points of order. Among 
the options, Krabbe mentions active criticisms and fallacy criticisms. The purport of an active 
criticism is that an argument offered by the other party is wrong, mistaken or insufficient. The 
purport of a fallacy criticism is that the argument is inadmissible. Only fallacy criticisms are 
considered to be points of order by Krabbe. 
In my view, including the option of making points of order contributes to the normative 
force and the empirical adequacy of models for critical discussion. Raising a point of order, for 
instance some kind of ambiguity criticism, can itself be seen as a contribution to the resolution of 
the dispute, and in that light as a good or a bad contribution. An ambiguity criticism is good if it 
detects a real ambiguity, forces the speaker to retract the ambiguous assertion, and gets the 
topical discussion in an efficient way back on a right track. So, good ambiguity criticisms 
contribute to conflict resolution. And an ambiguity criticism that is inappropriate, for instance 
                                                 
1 Pragma-dialectics has much to say about applying the rules to real discussions, but this is not considered part 
of the ideal model for critical discussion. However, in 1984 and 2000 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst propose a rule 
that states rights and obligations concerning requests for usage declaratives. These requests seem to be related to 
fallacy criticisms. 
2 Hamblin named contributions that pertain directly to the issue under consideration topil points. 
3 The opponent may criticize it by making a distinction between different readings. However, there is no real 
burden of proof associated with this criticism. 
4 Mackenzie, however, does not relate this to the theory of fallacies. 
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because there is no ambiguity that is of any consequence to the course of the dialogue, is a bad 
contribution, because it is an unfruitful digression that is a detour and can lead to a premature 
closure of the discussion. In section 5 I will maintain that, when the issue of ambiguity arises, 
discussants can react in an adequate way by raising two different but related types of fallacy 
criticism. They need to be able to criticize something as a fallacy of ambiguity, and in addition 
they can criticize something as a fallacy of equivocation. 
This view suggests the task of developing additional normative dialectical models for 
situations that are not optimal because the discussants use ambiguous expressions. Given that we 
are sometimes not capable of avoiding ambiguities, the dialectics for less than optimal situations 
describes the best way to proceed. In order to capture points of order, the model should be 
constituted by rules that do not  permit discussants to violate norms of critical discussions and 
that enable them to repair these violations, if they occur.  Such a model would be an extension of 
the pragma-dialectical theory and a contribution to the tradition of theorists who emphasize 
points of order (Hamblin, Mackenzie), active criticisms (Finocchiaro 1980) and fallacy criticisms 
Krabbe 1996) as integral parts of dialectics. 
My point is two-sided. On the one hand I want to maintain that ambiguity is worthy of being 
criticized as fallacious. On the other hand I also want to maintain that, in a way, ambiguity is 
admissible in a critical discussion.  
3. Ideally, discussants do not use contextually ambiguous sentences 
In order to be able to construct reasonable rules for using or criticizing ambiguities, we have 
to know what is or is not wrong with using ambiguous expressions in a discussion aimed at 
conflict resolution. It is my contention that using contextual ambiguity in an argument resembles 
a failure to argue ex concessis. 
It is a commonplace to say that ambiguity per se is not wrong at all. We are quite often able 
to communicate successfully while using sentences that are ambiguous in the sense that they 
mean one thing in the current context of use, and would mean quite a different thing if used in 
another context. This kind of ambiguity does not concern us here. In line with for instance 
Walton (1996, 22), we focus on ambiguity of a contextual nature: the use of semantically 
ambiguous sentences whose ambiguity is not easily resolved by the context of use. 
This paper is restricted to a simple kind of discussion, where there is a proponent who is 
committed to one main thesis and an opponent who doubts whether this thesis is acceptable. The 
proponent attempts to persuade the opponent of the view that, given her other commitments, she 
is committed to the proposition expressed in the main thesis. The opponent attempts to persuade 
the proponent of the view that her doubt regarding the main thesis is consistent with her overall 
position. 
To enable each other to make a serious attempt at persuasion, the discussants should 
cooperate by making their position clear, that is by making clear what they are exactly 
committed to. The proponent has to know what the opponent is committed to in order to be able 
to figure out what arguments might have success.  The opponent has to know what thesis the 
proponent is committed to, or by what arguments the proponent is trying to persuade her, in 
order to know whether she can coherently refuse to accept the thesis or the reasons that are 
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given. The scope of this paper is further restricted by considering only the proponent's use of 
ambiguities.5 
The propositional content of a commitment is communicated by sentences. Now suppose 
that the proponent makes an assertion by uttering a sentence S in some context, that the opponent 
is in this context disposed to distinguish more than one reading of S, that these readings are not 
ruled out by the semantics and that the opponent is in this context not able to choose one of these 
readings as the right one. In that case S is ambiguous for the opponent.6 If the opponent is 
maximally attentive, then it is clear to her that the proponent has committed himself to at least 
one of these propositions. Asserting an ambiguous sentence gives some information about the 
position of the speaker, but does probably not provide a sufficient basis for the opponent to 
develop a critical position. The speaker's choice of a sentence S as a vehicle to express a 
proposition in this context does not match the listener's disposition to interpret S in this context. 
If S functions as part of an argument, the proponent's choice of words resembles a failure to 
argue ex concessis. Just as in the case of a failure to argue ex concessis, making an assertion by a 
sentence that is ambiguous for the opponent is a failure to adjust the argument to the position of 
the opponent: the proponent does not tailor the argument to the semantic dispositions of the 
opponent.   
The most likely way to get such a defect repaired is by asking for a disambiguation of 
statements. A sentence S is a less ambiguous reformulation of sentence T in context C if and 
only if (i) all propositions expressed by S in C are also expressed by T in C, and (ii) there is at 
least one proposition expressed by T in C that is not expressed by S in C. This definition is a 
variant of Naess' definition of, what he named in Norwegian, 'en presisering' (Naess, 1966, 39). 
But we will consider these reformulations from a functional perspective, according to which S is 
a disambiguating reformulation of T in C if it is presented by a discussant as having the function 
of being a less ambiguous reformulation of T in C (whether S really is less ambiguous or not).7 If 
a request for a disambiguating reformulation is answered in an appropriate way, then the position 
of the speaker becomes clearer to the listener.  
Suppose the proponent makes an assertion by uttering 'Stopping before a traffic light is 
obligatory' and the opponent distinguishes in this context between two different propositions that 
can in this context be expressed non-ambiguously as 'Stopping before a traffic light is morally 
obligatory' and 'Stopping before a traffic light is legally obligatory'. According to the opponent 
then, the proponent committed himself to either the first or to the second proposition. If the 
proponent makes his intention clear by using one of these disambiguating reformulations the 
opponent's uncertainty with regard to the proponent's position disappears.  
As an ambiguity is often difficult to detect and as it is even more difficult to give an 
adequate analysis, there is a chance that the opponent does not see the weakness (or 
                                                 
5 In footnote 15 I shall give a motivation for this. 
6 The ambiguity of S should not depend on the awareness or actual behavior of the opponent, but on something 
that can only be indicated vaguely: for instance, the opponent's actual behavior towards S if she reflects thoroughly 
on her position or if her attention were directed to the need for making the distinction (M. Black 1990).  
7 To translate 'en presisering' by 'disambiguating reformulation' is a suggestion found in Barth and Krabbe, who 
themselves use the term 'clarifying reformulation' (1982, 21).  
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fallaciousness) of the proponent's argument or is not able to respond adequately. There are two 
specific risks involved.  
First, an unidentified ambiguity can lead to a misunderstanding, where the speaker thinks 
she made clear by uttering sentence S that she expressed one proposition, and the listener 
supposes that another proposition is naturally expressed by the speaker's use of S. This again can 
lead to pseudo-agreement or pseudo-disagreement (Naess 1966, 83-96).  
Secondly, the expression can be the source of what is known as the fallacy of equivocation.  
Viewed from a dialectical perspective, a proponent commits a fallacy of equivocation against an 
opponent, if (1) the opponent can distinguish between several readings of the argument, (2) there 
is a reading in which all reasons are acceptable to the opponent and there is another reading in 
which the warrant is acceptable to the opponent, and (3) the argument fails, whatever reading the 
proponent would choose, either because a warrant is in the end not acceptable to the opponent, or 
one of the reasons offered in the argument is in the end not acceptable to the opponent. In 
Walton's terms, the argument has either bite or bearing, but not both (Walton 1996, 19). If the 
ambiguity goes unnoticed, there is the risk that the opponent is misled by the appearance of 
soundness and fails to detect good opportunities to criticize the argument and for that reason 
loses the discussion needlessly. 
Using an ambiguous sentence can lead to misunderstanding or to a situation where the 
opponent does not see the opportunities to criticize the argument. If a sentence used by the 
proponent is contextually ambiguous, the proponent has committed the fallacy of ambiguity. So, 
according to my usage, committing a fallacy of equivocation entails committing a fallacy of 
ambiguity, but not vice versa.  
So ideally, discussants in a critical discussion do not use any contextually ambiguous 
sentences. However, the harmful effects of using ambiguous or equivocal arguments are not in 
all situations equally serious. Suppose the proponent asserts an ambiguous sentence S. Then the 
proponent's use of S does not match the opponent's dispositions to interpret S. But suppose 
further that the opponent had not yet made her semantic dispositions overt, that the opponent 
points our the ambiguity, and the proponent repairs his position by using disambiguating 
reformulations. Then at every stage the discussants are working towards resolution. Although the 
discussion started with some unclearness, this is cleared up during the discussion. If no other 
obstacles arise, every move brings the discussants closer towards conflict resolution. Such 
discussion fragments are in my view part of a critical discussion.  
But suppose that it was already clear in the discussion that, in the opponent's view, S is 
ambiguous.8 In a way, S is then disqualified in this discussion as contextually ambiguous: it is an 
overt fact that the opponent perceives S as ambiguous. If the proponent nonetheless asserts S, 
this move brings them further away from conflict resolution. Such a move is, in my view, not a 
part of a critical discussion. 
                                                 
8 This could be part of the shared background knowledge of the discussants; the discussants could have reached 
an agreement on it in the opening stage of the discussion; or the opponent could have expressed it during their 
present discussion. In the sketch of a formal model to be found in the appendix, I will only consider this last 
possibility. 
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4. Unfortunately, we do use ambiguous expressions 
Whether sentence S is ambiguous for the opponent depends, among other things, on whether 
the opponent can distinguish between different readings of S. If the proponent has a wrong 
picture of the opponent’s semantic dispositions this can lead to the situation where the proponent 
makes an assertion by uttering S, while S is ambiguous for the opponent and while the proponent 
did not intend to commit a fallacy of ambiguity. Whether sentence S is the source of the fallacy 
of equivocation depends on S's being ambiguous and on the lack of an effective persuasion 
strategy for the proponent after disambiguating the occurrences of S. So, if the proponent has an 
adequate picture of the opponent’s semantic dispositions, even then it is possible that he commits 
a fallacy of equivocation unintentionally, due to a wrong picture of the opponent’s (normal) 
commitments.9 As it is for the proponent not in all situations feasible to have an adequate picture 
of the opponent’s position, it is not reasonable to prohibit and exclude the use of contextually 
ambiguous sentences. 
An overview of different types of wrong pictures is given in the next figure. 
 
The proponent starts from a wrong picture of the opponent's position 
 
 
The proponent has a wrong 
picture of the opponent's 
(normal) concessions 
 
 
 
The proponent has a wrong picture of the 
opponent's dispositions to interpret a sentence 
 
 
 
 
(1) The 
proponent has 
a wrong 
picture of what 
reasons the 
opponent will 
be prepared to 
concede 
 
(2) The 
proponent has 
a wrong 
picture of what 
warrants the 
opponent will 
be prepared to 
concede 
(3) The proponent has 
an incomplete picture 
of the set of readings of 
a sentence that the 
opponent distinguishes 
 
 
(4) The proponent has 
an incorrect picture of 
the set of readings of a 
sentence that the 
opponent distinguishes10 
 
Figure 2: Wrong pictures underlying the fallacy of ambiguity and the fallacy of equivocation  
                                                 
9 Although in such a case the proponent is aware of committing a fallacy of ambiguity. 
10 In such a case the proponent has an incorrect picture of the opponent's semantic dispositions, according to 
which the opponent sees just one reading, while the opponent actually sees a few readings but not the reading the 
proponent had in mind. 
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The following examples illustrate that, for different reasons, we are not always able to avoid 
the use of contextually ambiguous sentences. An arrested person, W.B., describes the course of 
events of the night in which he was arrested for two offences. He supposedly drove a car, while 
his license was suspended and while he had drunk too much beer:11 
That evening, I left home for a visit to an acquaintance. I asked a friend to drive me [in 
my own car], for the judge had suspended my license. During the evening this friend left, 
so he couldn't drive me home. But my car wasn't safe there in front of this acquaintance’s 
house. I couldn't leave my car where it was. So I decided to bring my car to a safe place - 
a parking lot a little further on. I wasn't allowed to drive, and because of that I did, while 
walking, push the car, with its motor running, in the direction of the parking lot. I was 
arrested and I had drunk some beer. (Dutch jurisdiction: NJ 1991/29) 
Now, I imagine that the following discussions took place, the first one while W.B. pushed 
his car to the parking lot, the second one while the issue was discussed in court. 
Discussion 1: 
 Police officer, who had just arrived: Your license please. 
 W.B.: Well, there is no license. But I am not driving a car, so I will not get 
 convicted. 
 Officer: You are right that you are not driving a car, but only in the stricter 
 sense of 'driving'. Your thesis however only follows from a premise that states 
 that you are not driving a car in the legal sense, which is a wider sense. 
Discussion 2: 
 W.B.'s defending counsel: W.B. should not be convicted, for he did not drive a 
 car and only if he did drive a car, there are grounds to convict him.  
 Judge: W.B. did not drive a car in the stricter sense, but he did drive a car in 
 the wider sense. And the relevant articles of the law are about driving both in 
 the stricter as well as in the wider sense. 
Presumably, in discussion 1 W.B. starts from the wrong supposition that the police officer 
sees just one reading of the sentence ‘I am not driving a car’. W.B. reckons only with a stricter 
sense of driving. Further, W.B. wrongly supposed that the police officer would accept the 
warrant ‘if W.B. is not driving a car (in this strict sense) then W.B. will not get convicted’. So 
this is an example of a situation (type 3) where a proponent starts from an incomplete picture of 
the opponent’s dispositions to interpret a sentence, as well as of a situation (type 2) where a 
proponent starts from a wrong picture of what warrants the opponent is prepared to concede. 
The second discussion illustrates the situation where the defending counsel probably 
suspects there is an ambiguity, but wrongly thinks there is a disambiguation of his argument in 
which the reason along with the warrant is acceptable to the judge. The next scheme shows that 
                                                 
11 The translation is mine. The first dialogue fragment below was constructed by me, the second dialogue 
fragment resembles to some degree what happened in court. 
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this constitutes an example of the situation (type 2) where the proponent has a wrong picture of 
what warrants the opponent is prepared to concede. 
 
disambiguated reason or warrant defending counsel's 
picture of what the 
judge will accept12 
real picture of 
what the judge 
will accept 
W.B. did not drive a car (in the stricter 
sense). 
acceptable acceptable 
Only if W.B. did drive a car (in the stricter 
sense), there are grounds to convict him. 
acceptable not acceptable 
W.B. did not drive a car (in the wider 
sense). 
not acceptable not acceptable 
Only if W.B. did drive a car (in the wider 
sense), there are grounds to convict him. 
acceptable acceptable 
Figure 1: An example of a wrong picture that underlies committing the fallacy of 
equivocation. 
We are not always able to avoid ambiguous assertions and equivocal arguments if the 
ambiguities are not explicitly disqualified. The underlying ground is that we are not able to have 
a completely accurate and complete picture of the position of our opponents. As we are not 
always able to avoid fallacies of ambiguity or fallacies of equivocation, it is not reasonable to 
exclude the use of contextual ambiguities from critical discussions. Besides, our imperfections 
indicate the need for a dialectical procedure for making a point of order against the use of 
ambiguity. 
5. An optimal procedure for sub-optimal situations 
In the model I propose, named Ambiguity Dialectics (AD), there is a distinction between 
norms for critical discussion and rules for critical discussion.13 Norms for critical discussion 
indicate an optimal way of resolving disputes and are regulative (Searle 1970, 33) for AD-
discussions. In AD there is only one norm: 'Do not make assertions by uttering contextually 
ambiguous sentences!'.14 The AD-rules are the constitutive rules (Searle 1970, 33) for AD-
discussions. When in a dialogue an AD-rule is violated, the dialogue cannot be called an AD-
discussion in the proper sense. However it is possible to violate AD-norms within an AD-
discussion. In my view, the informal notion of a critical discussion or a persuasion dialogue is 
best modeled by something like AD, having both restrictive norms and more permissive rules. 
                                                 
12 This is a somewhat strong presupposition. It would suffice if the lawyer thinks there is a reasonable chance 
that this is an adequate picture of the judge's position. 
13 In van Eemeren & Grootendorst (2000), there is a distinction between rules for critical discussion and rules 
of conduct. It seems especially to be directed to two different levels of generality of norms for critical discussion (as 
they are called in this paper). 
14 In order to make the model more complete, other norms should be incorporated. 
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Norms should promote the most efficient ways to discuss the topic under consideration. In 
order to keep themselves on an efficient track towards resolution, discussants need to have the 
means at their disposal to criticize any move in which a norm is violated. Because the 
discussions under consideration are asymmetric, and only the proponent is able to assert topical 
points, only the opponent of the main thesis needs a device to criticize ambiguous assertions or 
ambiguous arguments.15 The AD-rules should, among other things, promote efficient ways to 
discuss points of order, active criticisms or fallacy criticisms. 
According to the AD-rules, the opponent is able to raise a fallacy criticism (as I will call it) 
only by making a statement of an assertive nature: you have made this particular move and by 
doing it you violated the norm!, by which she takes on a burden of proof. So, although the 
discussion is asymmetric in the sense that one party remains proponent of the main thesis while 
the other party remains the opponent of the main thesis, it must be possible for a shift of roles to 
occur after which the opponent of the main thesis becomes the proponent of a fallacy criticism. 
From now on I shall speak of the critic of the main thesis as White and of its proponent as Black. 
Desiderata of the procedure are that ambiguous assertions (relative to the opponent) are 
withdrawn and replaced by non-ambiguous ones, that inappropriate fallacy criticisms are 
withdrawn, and that requests for disambiguations are used as sparsely as possible. 
Opponents need to be able to criticize an ambiguous assertion by raising an ambiguity 
criticism. Raising such a criticism is an effective reaction to the threat of misunderstanding and 
to alleged instances of the fallacy of equivocation. A common way to criticize specific uses of 
ambiguity is by raising an equivocation criticism. This is an effective reaction to an alleged 
fallacy of equivocation, but is a device too heavy for some threats of misunderstanding. 
Equivocation criticism is therefore less basic than ambiguity criticism.  
A standard formulation of ambiguity criticism could be the following: 
You have made an assertion using sentence S while in this context S can express n 
different propositions.16 
White should have a burden of proof for this. First of all, she should retract such an 
ambiguity criticism if Black did not really use sentence S. But a discussion on this point is not 
very interesting, so there must be a constitutive rule to the effect that White can raise an 
ambiguity criticism against the use of a sentence S only if Black actually has uttered  S. Second, 
S must express n propositions. The most natural way for Black to criticize this second conjunct 
of ambiguity criticisms is to ask 'Which ones?'. White will then have to present n different 
formulations for n different propositions. To speed up the dialogue, this defense has been made 
an integral part of the standard formulation to criticize ambiguity. 
                                                 
15 The standard AD-sequence is that the proponent offers an argument, and then the opponent does or does not 
concede the reasons. If the opponent made a concession that is ambiguous for the proponent, then the proponent can 
freely make use of a more precise formulated reason and see whether the opponent concedes or challenges it. So 
there is no urgent need for the proponent to criticize an ambiguous concession.  
16 The focus of an ambiguity criticism or equivocation criticism in AD is an atomic sentence S, that can occur 
as a reason or thesis on its own, or as a constituent sentence of a logically more complex reason or thesis. 
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Ambiguity criticism: 
You have made an assertion using sentence S while in this context of use S can express n 
different propositions, and these propositions can, for this context, be adequately 
formulated as S1,....,Sn. 
Black should be able to investigate whether in this context S is ambiguous between S1,..,Sn 
by testing whether the semantics of their language really admits all Si's as proper disambiguating 
reformulations in this context. Since this is no study in semantics, I imagine that the discussants 
have some sort of utterance meaning machine at their disposal by which they can perform an 
utterance meaning testing procedure.17 This is inspired by other types of testing procedures (van 
Eemeren en Grootendorst 1992, 158). The machine enables the discussants to test whether, 
according to their language, disambiguating reformulations S1,....,Sn (which, as we saw, are 
reformulations that are offered as more precise reformulations of S, but for which it does not 
necessarily hold that they are functioning properly) express propositions that S does also express 
in the context of use.  
I presuppose that at least for some combinations of supposedly ambiguous sentences S, 
disambiguating reformulations S1,....,Sn and contexts C, it can be linguistically determined 
whether or not each Si expresses a proposition in C that S does also express in C. These linguistic 
data should constrain the discussants' options. It is also realistic to assume, however, that there 
are combinations of supposedly ambiguous sentences, disambiguating reformulations and 
contexts, for which the shared language does not give a clear result. In such a case S is 
ambiguous in a more subtle way. The 'W.B.' example illustrates the case where the language 
does not determine whether or not a term (and consequently sentences in which the term occurs) 
is ambiguous between two senses, but where the discussants have to decide by other means how 
to continue the discussion.18 
The utterance meaning machine is supposed to work as follows. Black puts a combination of 
S (the focus of White's fallacy criticism), S1,...,Sn (the disambiguated reformulations offered by 
White) and information about the context of use into the machine. The machine answers 
'negative' or 'positive'. The negative outcome means that two or more Si’s mean in this context 
exactly the same, or that some Si in this context does not express anything that S expresses in this 
context. The positive outcome means just that the outcome is not negative. This is the outcome, 
for example, if (1) every Si in this context means something else and every Si expresses a 
proposition in this context that S in this context also expresses, or if (2) there is at least one Si for 
which it holds that the language does not determine whether or not it expresses a proposition that 
S does in C, while there is no Sj for which it holds that the language precludes it as a proper 
disambiguating reformulation. If the test-outcome is negative, White has to retract her ambiguity 
criticism. If the test-outcome is positive, Black is obliged to accept the ambiguity criticism. 
This use of the machine entails that White's semantic dispositions are favored over those of 
Black in case the issue cannot be determined on the basis of the semantics. This reflects the idea 
                                                 
17 Our brain resembles such a machine, except that the outcome of the machine is overt and decisive for the 
commitments of the discussants. 
18 Using the pragma-dialectical notion of an opening stage this situation can be described as follows. The 
discussants have in the opening stage determined for some pairs of sentences, but not for all, that one of them is or is 
not a proper disambiguating reformulation of the other.  
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that Black has to tailor the attempt at persuasion to the position of White, also when it comes to 
semantic issues, but that the common language restricts White's freedom on semantic issues. 
After an ambiguity criticism, Black is allowed, and after a positive test-outcome even 
obliged, to accept the criticism. Black accepts it by offering a disambiguated argument, that is, 
Black's complete argument, as given until that stage of the discussion, in which each occurrence 
of S is disambiguated.  
One way for Black to disambiguate his argument is by replacing each occurrence of S by 
either S1 or ... or Sn. White has determined what formulations are appropriate, Black decides 
what assertions to make with them. This way Black repairs his violation of the norm and the 
discussion is back on track (as viewed by the discussants themselves). White should, as she is 
herself responsible for the adequacy of the sentences S1,...,Sn, not be allowed to raise an 
ambiguity criticism to one of these Si's. This restricts her freedom to criticize formulations as 
ambiguous.  
Yet another way for Black to disambiguate his argument is by replacing occurrences of S by 
disambiguated reformulations S'1,...,S'm that do not all occur in White's fallacy criticism. In this 
case, Black accepts that there is some ambiguity, but gives a (partly) different semantic analysis 
of it. This option for Black is needed, since White may distinguish semantically appropriate 
readings of S, but not all admissible readings that Black considers relevant for his defense.  
After such a move the sentences S'i that were not offered by White as adequate 
disambiguating reformulations of S must themselves be liable to ambiguity criticisms. 
Furthermore, the combination of S and S'1,...,S'm, together with the current context, must be 
liable to an utterance meaning testing procedure performed by White. When the outcome is 
positive, White must accept the reformulations as proper disambiguations19 (although she may 
still challenge the acceptability of reasons and warrants after a substitution takes place). When 
the outcome is negative Black must replace all occurrences of S by S1,...,Sn, the disambiguating 
reformulations chosen by White. 
I propose the following standard formulation for the fallacy of equivocation criticism: 
You have made an assertion using sentence S, while in this context S can express n 
different propositions, and these propositions can be, for this context, adequately 
formulated as S1,....,Sn, and furthermore, I shall win the discussion whatever 
disambiguated argument you will come up with. 
Black can react in the same ways as when White raised a simple ambiguity criticism. But 
White’s burden of proof for an equivocation criticism is heavier. White should retract her 
equivocation criticism if the test-outcome is negative, but also if Black accepts the ambiguity 
criticism that is part of the equivocation criticism, consequently disambiguates his argument and 
wins the ensuing dialogue. By presenting a disambiguating argument Black challenges White's 
equivocation criticism. If White concedes, at some point after her equivocation criticism, Black's 
main thesis, her criticism counts as withdrawn. Only by retracting his thesis, Black accepts an 
equivocation criticism. 
                                                 
19 Linguistic indeterminacy on the issue of synonymy will again lead to a positive outcome and will in this 
situation therefore be in favor of Black. 
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After raising an ambiguity or equivocation criticism and until retracting this criticism, Black 
should not be allowed to make an assertion by uttering sentence S. During these stages, S is a 
disqualified sentence. 
Until now, we considered a procedure for how to behave in case a norm has been violated. 
Within an AD discussion, there can be no such procedure for violations of the rules, for they 
constitute such discussions. But probably there is a reasonable procedure for rule-violations 
within other types of dialogue (cf. Walton & Krabbe 1995, chapter 3). 
6. Is ambiguity fallacious or not? 
In AD, the norms are part of a procedure for resolving conflicts in an optimal way. In a 
pragma-dialectical sense, violations of AD-norms are therefore fallacies. I shall call these Norm 
Violating Fallacies or N-fallacies. These moves deserve to be actively criticized as an obstacle to 
the resolution of the initial conflict of opinions, although they are a proper part of a discussion. 
N-fallacies are not ruled out by the rules of AD.20 I call violations of AD-rules Rule Violating 
Fallacies, or R-fallacies. These are more serious obstacles to conflict resolution. By committing 
an R-fallacy, the perpetrator has abandoned the confines of a critical discussion altogether.  
Whether some sentence S is contextually ambiguous or not depends on White’s language-
constrained choices or dispositions to interpret S. Whether such an ambiguity constitutes a N-
fallacy or a R-fallacy hinges on whether S is or is not disqualified at the stage of Black’s 
utterance of S. Whether S is part of a fallacy of equivocation hinges on whether Black has an 
effective persuasion strategy for his main thesis after presenting his disambiguated argument in 
which S is replaced by the allegedly non-ambiguous sentences. Contrary to Walton (1996, 72), I 
think there is a need for a fallacy of (contextual) ambiguity, besides a fallacy of equivocation. 
For there is a need for raising the more basic point of order that the proponent used a 
contextually ambiguous sentence, without predicting anything about the outcome of the ensuing 
dialogue. 
 
Black makes an assertion by uttering sentence S and White can distinguish 
between more than one reading of S and would be able to sustain an ambiguity 
criticism or equivocation criticism 
S is contextually ambiguous 
 
 
                                                 
20 The point of order dealt with in this paper can be related to Krabbe's distinction in the following way. An 
ambiguity or equivocation criticism can be seen as an active criticism relative to the rules and as a fallacy criticism 
relative to the norm (Krabbe 1996, 134-135).  
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S is not disqualified at the stage where 
Black makes an assertion by uttering S. 
                    An N-fallacy 
 
S is disqualified at the stage where Black 
makes an assertion by uttering S. 
                      An R-fallacy  
 
 
There is no dis-
ambiguation of Black's 
argument such that 
Black has an effective 
persuasion strategy, 
although there is a 
disambiguation in 
which all reasons can 
be made acceptable and 
there is a 
disambiguation such 
that the warrant can be 
made acceptable. 
 
An N-fallacy of 
ambiguity  
& 
An N-fallacy of 
equivocation 
In other cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N-fallacy of 
ambiguity 
There is no dis-
ambiguation of Black's 
argument such that 
Black has an effective 
persuasion strategy, 
although there is a 
disambiguation in 
which all reasons can 
be made acceptable and 
there is a 
disambiguation such 
that the warrant can be 
made acceptable. 
 
An R-fallacy of 
ambiguity  
& 
An R-fallacy of 
equivocation.  
In other cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R-fallacy of 
ambiguity 
Figure 3: Different types of fallacies 
Appendix: Towards a formal model of ambiguity dialectics 
In this appendix I give an incomplete sketch of a formal model that provides reasonable 
dialectical rights and obligations for discussants. The model AD is a close relative of the family 
of models for persuasion dialogues that is presented in Walton & Krabbe (1995). In the 
description of AD, I have made ample use of notations and ideas from these models. The models 
to be found there are richer in that they regulate incurring and retracting different kinds of 
commitments. AD is richer in that it contains rules concerning the use and criticism of 
ambiguous sentences and that it incorporates criticism of N-fallacies.  
AD has also features of pragma-dialectics, in that it makes use of the idea of a norm for 
critical discussion. Pragma-dialectics is richer in that it concerns also other important norms for 
critical discussion. AD is richer in that it incorporates the norm for language use into a more 
permissive dialectical model in which fallacies or norm-violations can be discussed. 
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Norms of discussion 
There is only one norm in AD, the one stated in section 5. To improve the model, other 
norms should be incorporated. 
Norm: Do not make assertions by uttering sentences that are contextually ambiguous! 
The norm has a strategic flavor, for what is or is not a contextually ambiguous sentence is, 
according to the present perspective, determined during the dialogue. If a sentence is or gets 
disqualified at a certain stage, while it is not reinstated at a later stage of the discussion as not-
disqualified, then this sentence is at all stages of the discussion contextually ambiguous. 
Locution Rules of AD 
In the locution rules, it is stated what language the discussants use, what speech acts they 
can perform with sentences of this language and what a move in an AD-discussion looks like. 
 
1) The language that is used in the discussion is the language of sentential logic, 
named L. The set of sentences of L is defined by using an infinite set of atomic 
sentence letters, P1, P2, P3, ...., the logical connectors, ∧, ∨, ¬, →, ↔, and 
parentheses, ) and (. All atomic sentence letters are sentences of L. Suppose S 
and T are sentences of L, then so are (S∧T), (S∨T), ¬S, (S→T) and (S↔T). 
Nothing else is a sentence of L. In order to refer to arbitrary sentences of L,  use 
will be made of the letters S, S', T, T', S1, S2,...., T1, T2,..., S’1, S’2,...., T'1,T'2,... 
2) The following types of locutions or speech acts are permitted during the 
dialogue.  
Elementary arguments: 
 T1&...&Tn 
 
 
       T 
     or equivalently, T1&...&TnsoT, 
     or more shortly, ∆soT. 
Disambiguated basic arguments at a certain stage: (see definition below) 
Concessions:    c(S) 
Challenges:    S?? 
Fallacy criticisms: 
Ambiguity criticisms:   (S)Amb(S1,...,Sn),  
where S, S1,...,Sn are atomic sentence letters. 
Equivocation criticisms:   (S)Amb(S1,...,Sn)&I'll win the ensuing dialogue,  
      where S, S1,...,Sn are atomic sentence letters. 
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Retractions:  nc(S),  
nc((S)Amb(S1,...,Sn)),  
nc((S)Amb(S1,...,Sn)&I'll win the ensuing dialogue) 
  
By 'disambiguated basic argument at stage i' the following is meant. The rules of DA are 
such that White is allowed to challenge one of the elements Q of an elementary argument 
T1&...&TnsoT. The elements of an elementary argument are the reasons Ti and the associated 
warrant (T1∧...∧Tn)→T. After such a challenge Black has a prima facie obligation to offer an 
elementary argument for the challenged element. So, when at a stage Black has offered a few 
elementary arguments, they can be combined into one complex of elementary arguments. Such a 
complex is named a basic argument by Walton and Krabbe (1995, p. 129), and is defined by me 
in a slightly different way. 
1) Eementary arguments T1&...&TnsoT are basic arguments. 
2) If ∆ is a basic argument with premises T1,....,Tj,....,Tn and conclusion T, and if 
T'1,....,T'm are any sentences of L, then the configuration ∆', which one gets by 
writing the following configuration of linked premises and a brace and arrow 
 T'1&...& T'm 
 
 
 Tj 
over Tj, or over the added associated warrant (T1∧...∧Tn)→T in the following manner 
  T'1&...& T'm 
 
 
T1 & ... & Tn & (T1∧...∧Tn)→T 
is again a basic argument. 
3) Nothing is a basic argument that cannot be constructed by the above two rules. 
If White criticizes Black of having used some contextually ambiguous atomic sentence, she 
does this by presenting the allegedly ambiguous atomic sentence S and some disambiguating 
reformulations S1,...,Sn. A disambiguated basic argument at stage i is formed by the basic 
argument constituted by all elementary arguments that Black has offered until stage i, in which 
all occurrences of S are replaced by occurrences of S1,...,Sn or by occurrences of even other 
atomic sentences S'1,...,S'm. 
4) A move is made up of either: 
• a challenge, possibly combined with some concessions, or 
• an elementary argument, or 
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• a fallacy criticism, or 
• an utterance meaning testing procedure, possibly combined with a disambiguated basic 
argument, or 
• a disambiguated basic argument, or 
• a retraction of a fallacy criticism, or 
• a concession of the main thesis, possibly combined with a retraction of an equivocation 
criticism, or 
• a retraction of the main thesis. 
Commitment Rules 
In order to enable the discussants to keep track of their obligations, the focal points of these 
obligations, sentences, are kept in accessible stores. The commitment rules determine what gets 
into and out of these stores. White can commit herself not only to topical sentences, but also to 
the view that Black has violated a norm by using an ambiguous sentence S. 
1) Each party has a commitment store, which indicates the party's obligations at a 
certain stage of the discussion. A commitment store is a set with sentences or 
fallacy criticisms as its elements. 
2) At the start of the discussion Black's commitment store contains exactly one 
sentence, which is the main thesis throughout the discussion. White's 
commitment store may be empty, but may also contain sentences. 
3) If White uses the expression c(S) at a stage i, then from the next stage on, White's 
commitment store also contains S. 
4) If Black uses an elementary argument T1&....TnsoT at stage i, then from stage i+1 
Black's commitment store contains T1 and .... and Tn, and also the warrant 
associated with the elementary argument (T1∧....∧Tn)→T. 
5) If White raises a fallacy criticism at stage i (S)Amb(S1,...,Sn) or 
(S)Amb(S1,...,Sn)&I'll win the ensuing dialogue, then from the next stage on, 
White's commitment store contains this fallacy criticism. 
6) If White raises a fallacy criticism against S, then S is disqualified until White 
retracts this fallacy criticism. 
7) If Black uses a disambiguated basic argument at stage i, then Black's 
commitment store is emptied and filled again with all basic (i.e., not yet 
supported) reasons of the disambiguated basic argument together with all 
warrants associated with the elementary arguments that make up the 
disambiguated basic argument. 
8) If a party retracts a sentence S or a fallacy criticism F at stage i, then from the 
next stage on, S or F is no longer an element of this party's commitments store. 
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Structural Rules 
1) The parties move alternately. 
2) White makes the first move in which she challenges Black's main thesis. 
3) If in the preceding move White challenged Black's assertion T, then Black has to 
offer an elementary argument, ∆soT.  
4) ∆soT may be used only if some earlier move contained T??. 
5) If the preceding move contained an elementary argument ∆soT, White must 
either challenge one element Q (a reason or a warrant) of the argument ∆soT, 
challenge one element Q (a reason or a warrant) of the argument ∆soT and 
concede some other elements of ∆soT, raise a fallacy criticism, or concede the 
main thesis. 
6) A challenge Ti?? by White is allowed only if Ti is not a concession of White, Ti 
has not been challenged before, Ti is in Black’s commitment store and Ti is an 
element of the argument offered by Black in the preceding move. 
7) If S is an atomic sentence that occurs within an argument offered by Black at 
stage j, then White is allowed to utter (S)Amb(S1,...,Sn) or to utter 
(S)Amb(S1,...,Sn)&I'll win the ensuing dialogue at stage j+1, unless S has been 
proposed by White as a disambiguated reformulation in some fallacy criticism at 
stage i, i<j. 
8) If the preceding move contains (S)Amb(S1,...,Sn), or (S)Amb(S1,...,Sn)&I'll win the 
ensuing dialogue then Black must either  
a. perform an utterance meaning testing procedure, that is, check whether 
in this context of use each of the Si's is a formulation of an interpretation 
of S that is admissible from a linguistic point of view, or 
b. offer a disambiguated basic argument.21 
9) If the outcome of an utterance meaning testing procedure performed by Black is 
negative, then White must retract the fallacy criticism. If the outcome is positive, 
then Black is obliged to present a disambiguated basic argument in the same 
move. 
10)  If Black offers a disambiguated argument in which he uses disambiguated 
formulations S'1,...,S'm, that were not proposed by White in her fallacy criticism 
(S)Amb(S1,...,Sn) or in (S)Amb(S1,...,Sn)&I'll win the ensuing dialogue, then White 
may perform an utterance meaning testing procedure that has as an input the 
allegedly ambiguous sentence S, the set of disambiguated formulations S'1,...,S'm 
and the current context of use C. If the outcome is positive, Black repeats his 
disambiguated argument, if the outcome is negative, Black is obliged to offer a 
new disambiguated basic argument, in which all occurrences of S are replaced by 
using only S1,...,Sn. 
                                                 
21 This still leaves Black two options: using White’s linguistic analysis or using an alternative analysis. 
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11) If an earlier stage contained a utterance meaning testing procedure with as input 
S, S1,...,Sn and C, then it is not allowed to perform this test with exactly this input 
again. 
12)  If Black uses some atomic sentence Si in a disambiguated basic argument and Si 
does not occur in a fallacy criticism by White, then White has the right to raise a 
fallacy criticism of Si. 
13)  If the preceding move contains an equivocation criticism, and Black offers a 
disambiguated basic argument, then this move counts as a challenge to the 
second conjunct of White's criticism, because by doing so Black starts a 
discussion such that if it leads to White’s conceding the main thesis, White 
immediately has to retract her equivocation criticism. 
14)  If Black offers a disambiguated argument then White may challenge a basic 
reason of this complex argument, or one of the basic warrants that are associated 
with the elementary arguments that make up the disambiguated argument. 
15)  If White wins the discussion after she raised an equivocation criticism, then the 
equivocation criticism counts as sustained.22 
16)  If White raises a fallacy criticism at stage i+1 and retracts it at stage j, then 
Black is allowed to repeat at stage j+1 his argument offered at stage i. 
17)  If White has uttered an equivocation criticism, has not yet retracted it and utters 
c(T), where T is the main thesis, then she has to retract the equivocation criticism 
immediately. 
18)  It is not allowed to use disqualified sentences. 
19)  At every stage, Black is allowed to utter nc(T), where T is the main thesis of the 
discussion. 
20)  At every stage, White is allowed to utter c(T), where T is the main thesis of the 
dialogue. 
Win-and-Loss Rules 
1) If Black utters nc(T), T being the main thesis, then Black has lost the discussion, 
and White has won the discussion. 
2) If White utters c(T), T being the main thesis, then White has lost the discussion, 
and Black has won the discussion. 
                                                 
22 In AD it is possible that an ambiguity criticism is retracted or sustained, after which the discussion 
continues. Raising this type of fallacy criticism has direct procedural consequences: is  S disqualified or not.  In AD 
it is not possible for the discussion to continue after an equivocation criticism has been sustained (but in some cases 
it is possible if it is retracted), for in a move in which it is sustained the discussion ends. However, the result of such 
an elementary kind of discussion is not only that party X won or lost the discussion, but also that, for at least these 
discussants, and for these kinds of issues, sentence S is disqualified or not. The result of a successful equivocation 
criticism can have consequences for other, related discussions. 
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